

**Enemies into Allies:
American Stability Operations and the
Transformation of Japan 1945-1952**

**A Monograph
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Abstract

ENEMIES INTO ALLIES: AMERICAN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN 1945-1952 by MAJ Lawrence E. Skelly, III, USA, 54 pages.

The current U.S. Army operating concept prominently includes stability operations built on the core competency of wide area security. Stability operations secure national goals for military action by establishing the conditions for lasting peace after conflict or by mitigating the effects of humanitarian crisis. During the occupation of Japan following the end of World War II, American forces conducted stability operations that effectively did both. In the process, the American occupation forces transformed a defeated enemy nation into valued ally.

This study identified lessons applicable to future missions from the American stability operations conducted in Japan from 1945 to 1952 by examining the strategy for the occupation, the operational plan, and the stability tasks conducted. The United States prior to 1945 adopted a strategy that defined the ends, ways, and means for occupation of Japan upon successful conclusion of combat operations in the Pacific Theater. American forces led by GEN Douglas MacArthur developed plans for occupation that translated national strategy into stability tasks to units in ways that can be examined through current doctrine's elements of operational design. The operational units of the occupation forces, like the U.S. Eighth Army, executed both initial responses and transformative actions that significantly contributed to the recovery of Japan in the post-war period. While the occupation of Japan was conducted under unique circumstances, lessons can be drawn from the American actions that set conditions for Japan's return to global prominence within the context of an alliance that has secured peace between Japan and the United States for over sixty years.

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Introduction

Full spectrum operations, the fusion of offensive, defensive and stability operations, is the central concept in current doctrine for U.S. Army operations.¹ The recently released Army Operating Concept identifies two core competencies for American land power as necessary for full spectrum operations – combined arms maneuver and wide area security.² Wide area security focuses on the stability operations leg of the full spectrum operations triad. Stability operations involve establishing and then maintaining conditions of relative peace for the native peoples of the operating area and the occupying American forces. Successful stability operations are essential to achieving American foreign policy aims when the United States employs its land forces beyond its borders.

The American armed forces' conduct of stability operations has not always achieved the ends the nation may have wished. However, U.S. forces have succeeded both in the short and in the long terms on several occasions. One example of successful U.S. Army stability operations is the occupation of Japan from 1945 until 1952 at the conclusion of World War II. Prior to the occupation, Allied leaders feared possible fanatical Japanese resistance against “demonic Anglo-Americans” in keeping with the *kamikaze* suicide attacks of the last year of the war. Effective American use of Japanese governmental authority and overwhelming demonstration of American military force

¹ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2008), 3-1.

² U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, *The United States Army Operating Concept, 2016-2028* (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, August 19, 2010), 11.

successfully deterred any armed resistance to Allied occupation.³ Effective stability operations in Japan disarmed the defeated nation and prevented the spread of anarchy and mass starvation despite the utter devastation wrought by American bombing. Stability operations also set conditions for lasting peace and complete transition to Japanese sovereign civil authority in only seven years. The war and the subsequent occupation transformed Japan from an implacable foe, alien in culture, totalitarian in government, and unabashedly aggressive towards its neighbors into a reliable ally, a key trading partner, and a stable democracy.

Observers have provided differing narratives of the impact of American stability operations on the Japan that emerged from the occupation. In examining American contributions to Japan provided during the occupation, one can study the strategy for occupation that evolved during World War II, the operational planning conducted by MacArthur's units prior to the Japanese surrender, and the execution of stability operations by American formations from 1945 to 1952. Strategically, the United States methodically developed ways and means to employ in order to achieve its post-conflict ends, which provides a first source of lessons. Upon the capitulation of Japan, American forces in the Pacific set in motion a fully developed operational plan for occupation of the Japanese home islands called Operation BLACKLIST.⁴ American forces that executed BLACKLIST provided examples of each of the five major stability tasks identified in

³ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 22.

⁴ Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP), *The Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase Volume I Supplement*, 1994 ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 2.

current U.S. Army doctrine.⁵ The American occupation of Japan stands as good example of well-executed stability operations. Lessons identified from study of post-World War II stability operations in Japan are applicable to current and future operations that confront the U.S. Army.

The existing historical examinations of the American occupation of Japan attributed the rise of post-war Japan to several different sources. Beginning with writings concurrent with the occupation and continuing to the present day, different authors emphasized different elements of the environment in the defeated nation as the genesis of future Japanese success. These narratives can be grouped together into three categories. The first two stressed Japanese efforts at recovery with the American influences viewed in a mixed way. A third gave significant credit to the efforts of the American occupiers for Japan's emergence as a peaceful free market democracy. Study of literature from all three categories is necessary to understand the variety of factors and actions that have led to the post-World War II Japanese reemergence as a leading state in the world. However, the lessons identified by the literature emphasizing American occupational successes can be most helpful in guiding future occupational planning and execution.

The first prominent narrative that seeks to explain the successful rise of Japan after World War II suggested that the war-weary Japanese willingly seized on the opportunities presented by American reforms. In this narrative, modern Japan is chiefly a result of the "Japanization" of Western ideals, economics, and culture by the Japanese people during the occupation and afterwards. John Dower, author of the Pulitzer Prize-

⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2008), 2-9.

winning history *Embracing Defeat*, is one author that can be placed in this category.⁶ This work explained the physical and psychological devastation of the Japanese nation through heart-wrenching anecdotes of ordinary Japanese men, women, and children struggling to survive in the post-war occupational environment. Dower argued that Japan lacked the capacity to continue effective resistance after the summer of 1945. American destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs along with the Soviet Union's attack on Japanese forces in Manchuria finally shattered the last hopes of Emperor Hirohito and Japan's governmental leadership.⁷ Jun Eto suggested that surrender was greeted by the Japanese with "a strange sense of relief."⁸ William Manchester, in his biography of MacArthur, described the Japanese people as comfortable with the rules of occupation, cooperative with American officials, and self-disciplined in their efforts to rebuild the country.⁹ Japan accepted, sometimes willingly and sometimes without hope of resistance, the wide-sweeping social, political, and economic reengineering imposed by the Americans. From this "revolution from above," Japan took tools that the nation adapted to Japanese cultural norms.¹⁰ In this first narrative group, the Japanese people rebuilt themselves into the distinctly Japanese version of a modern free market democracy that is now a major player in world affairs.

⁶ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 25.

⁷ Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000), 511.

⁸ Jun Eto, *A Nation Reborn – A Short History of Postwar Japan* (Tokyo: International Society for Education Information, 1974), 8.

⁹ William Manchester, *American Caesar – Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), 472.

¹⁰ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 69.

Similarly to this first group, a second category of narratives credit positive change to the Japanese themselves, rather than the American occupiers. This second category, characterized well by Kawai Kazuo's *Japan's American Interlude*, attributes success to Japanese application of native "situational ethics" to adapt to the new rules emplaced by the occupying powers, resilience of the Japanese character, and reemergence of native Japanese strength after the end of the occupation.¹¹ Kawai argued that America's "overwhelming intrusion" into Japanese development had an indelible impact on the nation.¹² However, this school of more nationalistic discussion did not look at the American occupation as a real foundation for Japanese resurgence. Japan's capacity for world prominence was defeated in World War II, but not devastated. William Beasley argued that postwar Japan can be viewed as a return to that nation's attempts to match the Western world in modernization characteristic of its time before the rise of the militarists in the 1930s.¹³ James Matray argued that Japan rebuilt itself on its prewar foundation of industrialization and economic development fostered by Meiji Restoration.¹⁴ According to Robert Harvey, Emperor Hirohito and surviving conservative elements of Japanese society thwarted the more progressive elements of American reforms and then rallied the Japanese people to a renewed nationalism based on economic power.¹⁵ For Irokawa Daikichi, America simply unleashed the Japanese people from the restraints of militarism

¹¹ Kawai Kazuo, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 4.

¹² Ibid., v.

¹³ William G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 280.

¹⁴ James I. Matray, *Japan's Emergence as a Global Power* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), 29.

¹⁵ Robert Harvey, *American Shogun – General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the Drama of Modern Japan* (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 2006), 11.

and authoritarian rule.¹⁶ The Japanese nation remained strong and resourceful even after the shattering physical destruction of the war and the stinging degradation of American occupation. Brian McVeigh contends that this “pattern of national regeneration” demonstrated in Japan’s cyclic recasting of itself dominates current Japanese opinion about the origin of the nation’s current global prominence.¹⁷ With its Japan-centric viewpoint, this second category of narratives casts the resilient Japanese themselves as the prime mover in the post-war resurgence of Japan.

While the Japanese people certainly deserve great credit for the rebirth of their nation after it was reduced to smoking ruins by the Allies in World War II, the first two narrative categories fail to fully explain why Japan transformed from aggressive empire to successful Far Eastern ally of the United States. The Japanese-centric literature provides little insight onto the conduct of stability operations. A third narrative category helped to fill these gaps, and this category formed the principal basis for this study of the occupation. The third narrative posited that the United States planned and prepared well to occupy Japan after securing victory in the Pacific. Thus prepared, Allied forces led by the U.S. Army executed transformative stability occupations that laid the basis for stable peace and Japanese reentrance into the international community as a partner to the United States. *Inside GHQ* by Takemae Eiji advanced this line of discourse by focusing attention on the diverse actions of MacArthur’s staff and forces during the occupation.¹⁸ First-

¹⁶ Irokawa Daikichi, *The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan*, trans. Mikiso Hane and John K. Urda (New York: Free Press, 1995), 39.

¹⁷ Brian J. McVeigh, *Nationalisms of Japan – Managing and Mystifying Identity* (Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 58.

¹⁸ Takemae Eiji, *Inside GHQ: the Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York: Continuum, 2002), xlii.

person accounts, like those of Theodore Cohen and Justin Williams, Sr., further explain the motivations, actions, and outcomes of the economic and political reforms instituted by the American occupiers. As a civil affairs officer assigned to GEN MacArthur's Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) General Headquarters (GHQ) during the occupation, Cohen assisted with implementation of the labor reforms and economic policy. He referred to the occupation as causing a "third turn" in Japanese history as momentous and irreversible as the earlier Meiji Reformation of the late nineteenth century.¹⁹ Cohen remained in Japan as a private citizen for more than twenty years after the occupation and observed up close the long-term effects of those reforms on Japanese society. Williams was also a SCAP civil affairs officer during the occupation and was assigned to aid the myriad political reforms including the creation of the 1947 Constitution.²⁰ Other writers concur with the conclusion that modern Japan was fundamentally shaped by the transformative efforts of the American occupation forces. Herbert Bix highlighted the inability of Emperor Hirohito and other conservative Japanese actors to reverse the democratization and liberalization of the Japanese people brought by American reforms and enshrined in the American-produced Constitution.²¹ William Chapman particularly highlighted the actions of American forces during the first three years that produced enduring changes like truly representative government and legal equality for women that have proved immensely popular with the general Japanese

¹⁹ Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal*, ed. Herbert Passin (New York: Free Press, 1987),

²⁰ Justin Williams, Sr., *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur – A Participant's Account* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1979), xiii.

²¹ Bix, *Hirohito*, 13-14.

public.²² Similarly, Peter Duus claimed that American reforms like the 1947 Constitution effected the transformation of Imperial Japan into the “Japan, Inc.” that is a vital member of the world economy.²³ Duus argued that Americans established a balance between liberals and conservatives in Japan that established the environment necessary of Japan’s economic recovery.²⁴ From this third narrative as well as the historical records of the American units that occupied Japan from 1945 to 1952, military and civilian planners can identify valuable lessons applicable to current and future post-conflict stability operations.

The American occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 took place in a unique environment, and three categories of narratives have arisen to explain the emergence of Japan from defeat to renewed prominence. The unique cultural characteristics of the Japanese people, perhaps best described for English-speaking audiences by Ruth Benedict’s classic *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, played a major role in all discussions.²⁵ Similarly, the physical and psychological ruin wrought by Allied military force during the war on the Japanese nation cannot be discounted. Numerous observers of the aftermath of the war have sought to place the basis for Japan’s rebirth on the actions of the Japanese people themselves, whether the nation sought to make the best of the horrors of defeat or the nation called on native strength to rebuild despite its humiliation.

²² William Chapman, *Inventing Japan – The Making of a Postwar Civilization* (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1991), 27.

²³ Peter Duus, “Introduction” in *The Cambridge History of Japan*, v.6: *The Twentieth Century* ed. Peter Duus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 3.

²⁴ Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 272.

²⁵ Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Riverside Press, 1946), 1-3.

These observations demonstrated some merits. However, the category of studies that described the actions of the American occupiers as the transformative agent for Japan from militarist aggression to peaceful international contribution provided the best basis for applicable lessons for current and future stability operations. In keeping with this third narrative grouping, this study examines the occupation of Japan with focus on American policy, strategy, planning and execution in order to identify lessons for future use.

Strategy for Stability Operations

Study of the policy and strategy behind the American occupation of Japan provided lessons of use for stability operations into the current era and beyond. The United States Government of that time recognized the need for stability operations following cessation of hostilities even before entering World War II.²⁶ From a multi-year planning effort with consultations between the Allies and between government departments, the United States developed clear strategic ends for the occupation of Japan. The American administration discerned the necessary ways those ends were to be achieved, and took action to generate the means to fulfill a strategy based on the necessity of stability operations in a defeated Japan.

The United States, as the lead nation in the struggle for victory over Japan in World War II, developed policy to direct the conduct of the war. The State Department began the establishment of policy advisory boards in 1939 related to conduct of the coming war. The War Department also established staff elements to oversee development of plans and resources for post-conflict stability operations, such as the Military

²⁶ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1964), 7.

Governance Division in 1940 and the Civil Affairs Division in 1943.²⁷ These boards and staff elements generated policy options that President Roosevelt, cabinet members like Secretary of State Hull and Secretary of War Stimson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) debated and refined.²⁸ Ultimately, the president set the overarching U.S. policies for governance of occupied territories. Later strategic planning organizations like U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) evolved from the early boards and elements to provide detailed policies for occupation of Japan based on the decisions of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.²⁹ The JCS translated these policies into executable directives to MacArthur and SCAP.

True to its ideals and cognizant of the potential to shape the future world order presented by the coming total war, the Roosevelt Administration developed ambitious goals to remake Japan in the image of the West – a stable limited-government democracy with a free-market economy.³⁰ Additionally, the United States determined that Japan must be disarmed to “insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.”³¹ Importantly, President Roosevelt and his advisors established the total defeat of Japan and its elimination as a future threat through post-conflict

²⁷ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 15.

²⁸ Marlene J. Mayo, “American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: The Role of the Experts,” in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 44.

²⁹ Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 6.

³⁰ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 150-53.

³¹ Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1948), 123.

transformation as key elements of war strategy quickly after the attack on Pearl Harbor.³² By establishing post-war transformation of Japan into a democratized partner of the United States as a principal aim of its World War II strategy, the U.S. Government was able to develop the ways and means to accomplish this end that ensured real resolution of the conflict between the two nations.

With a clear aim of transformation of Japan in mind, the U.S. Government also quickly settled on military occupation of Japan as the primary way to achieve the nation's post-war strategic end. Experience after World War I demonstrated to the United States that a well-armed, visible, and total occupation of a defeated nation was necessary to solidify the outcome of war.³³ Both the State Department and the Army felt that the post-World War I Allied occupation of the German Rhineland had been insufficient because it had left most of German territory unoccupied and had failed to demonstrate to the majority of Germans that their armed forces had been soundly defeated. This consensus led to interdepartmental agreement that the United States must be fully prepared to occupy and govern both Germany and Japan if the coming war was brought to successful conclusion by the Allies. All elements agreed that U.S. Army forces would be required to occupy Japan for several years in the post-war environment to secure the terms of war cessation.³⁴ Agreement on the method of governance of the occupied territories caused

³² Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 15-16.

³³ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 6-7. In contrast to a total occupation of all of a defeated state's territories, the victorious nations in World War I conducted a limited occupation after the 1918 armistice. French, British, American, and allied forces occupied a small but economically important area of Germany between the Rhine River and the Franco-German frontier called the Rhineland for several years. Beyond the direct reach of occupation forces, Adolph Hitler's extremist faction rose up in unoccupied Germany, seized power, abrogated the Treaty of Versailles, and later attacked France and Britain.

³⁴ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 7.

greater debate. President Roosevelt and others preferred that civilians under the State Department govern conquered Japan, but this solution was scrapped because the State Department lacked the capacity to complete the task successfully.³⁵ Accordingly, the Roosevelt Administration tasked the U.S. Army to prepare to govern territories occupied as part of World War II with the expectation of assistance from other agencies. Having established transformation of Japan through occupation led by the U.S. Army as the strategic ends and ways for successful conclusion of war with Japan by early 1942, the United States devoted significant efforts to develop the means necessary to carry out a strategy that rested on occupation as a critical element.

The Army began to develop the necessary means for occupation after war with the Axis Powers began to appear inevitable. These means included new doctrine and new training. The Army published FM 27-5 *Military Governance* in 1940 after initial discussions in the government began to favor occupation as part of the U.S. war strategy. The Army subsequently revised the manual in 1943 to incorporate experiences from North Africa and other occupied territories.³⁶ This doctrine outlined principals of occupation, methods for organization of governance teams, and civil affairs tasks to be conducted.³⁷ The Army also established a School for Military Governance (SMG) to provide trained officers to implement this doctrine. Army policymakers projected that specialized civil affairs officers were needed because governance duties were too

³⁵ Peter F. Schaefer and P. Clayton Schaefer, "Planning for Reconstruction and Transformation of Japan after World War II," in *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies*, edited by Greg Kaufmann (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2008), 79.

³⁶ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 7.

³⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, FM 27-5, *United States Army and Navy for Military Governance* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 22, 1943), iii-ix.

resource-intensive for officers detailed from combat formations to conduct without damaging the effectiveness of their units. The school was located at the University of Virginia campus in Charlottesville, Virginia, in order to ensure that it could draw effectively on the civilian, military, and academic resources of the region.³⁸ The Army repeatedly expanded the SMG in order to increase the numbers of officers put through its months-long course that included topics as diverse as city planning, public administration, cultural studies, and international standards of justice. The Army also established six follow-on Civil Affairs Training Schools (CATS) at Yale, Harvard, Northwestern, Chicago, Michigan, and Stanford Universities to better take advantage of American academic strengths in governance-related fields of study.³⁹ The SMG and CATS graduated thousands of officers between their beginnings in 1942 and the start of the occupation of Japan in August 1945, but these officers were scattered across the world administering the war-torn territories cleared by Allied forces. Only 297 civil affairs officers were available for the occupation of Japan in late 1945.⁴⁰

In addition to creation of occupation doctrine and of a cadre of trained civil affairs officers, the Army developed unique organizations to lead occupation interaction with local populations called military governance (MG) units. Rather than simply embed civil affairs soldiers into combat formations, the Army chose to create separate Table of Organization and Equipment for MG units. These separate units prevented diversion of combat power from war-fighting in the same way the creation of civil affairs officers at

³⁸ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 11.

³⁹ Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution*, 2.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

the SMG allowed combat arms officers to focus on fire and maneuver.⁴¹ FM 27-5 called for MG units to interact with the local governments within American-occupied areas or to function as local governments in the absence of civilian bodies.⁴² MG units included both military and civilian specialists in essential services, like electricity and sanitation, as well as individuals trained to assist in local governance capacity building. A typical MG unit in Japan assigned by SCAP to oversee each of Japan's prefectures consisted of seven civil affairs officers, an equal number of civilian specialists, and roughly twenty enlisted men.⁴³ Army planners designed MG units to be controlled by their own chain of command to ensure that occupation policies were uniformly implemented throughout an occupied zone. By operating in coordination but separately from combat units controlling occupied battle-space, MG units prevented disruption of governance as security units were transferred due to changing operational conditions. Spurred by U.S. national strategic requirements to conduct military occupations of liberated or conquered areas, the Army created essential doctrine, training, and organizations to effectively execute occupational duties required to successfully fulfill the strategy to transform Japan after cessation of hostilities.

The basis for the success of the American occupation of Japan was the war strategy adopted by the Allies for lasting victory over Imperial Japan. This war strategy early on established the transformation of Japan into a peaceful democracy as a desired end for the war in the Pacific. Once this end was established, the U.S. Government

⁴¹ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 8.

⁴² U.S. Army, FM 27-5, *Military Governance* (1943), 2.

⁴³ Robert L. Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo* (New York: Viking Press, 1950), 275.

concluded that military occupation of the Japanese home islands was the necessary way to accomplish this goal based on prior American post-conflict experiences. The Army effectively developed the means needed to successfully carry out the national war strategy with comprehensive doctrine, training, and specialized organization for military governance. In short, the United States in World War II embraced stability operations as an essential component of its strategy for winning the war and for sustaining the ensuing peace. The United States then resourced stability operations effectively by adapting the Army for sustained post-conflict occupation operations. U.S. strategic success as well as Japanese resurgence resulted in large part from this policy. Future employments of U.S. military power should be shaped by similarly well-conceived strategic concepts.

Operational Plan for Stability Operations

When the lead elements of MacArthur's forces landed at Atsugi Airfield south of Tokyo on August 28, 1945, those Soldiers enacted the initial steps of Operation BLACKLIST.⁴⁴ BLACKLIST was a detailed plan for the occupation of Japan in the event of sudden Japanese capitulation. The plan represented the culmination of dedicated planning efforts by U.S. Government planners since at least 1942.⁴⁵ MacArthur's staff produced BLACKLIST from the policy guidance and strategic condition setting of American planners in Washington. In contemporary parlance, the operational planners for BLACKLIST successfully framed the problem of occupation of Japan, formulated an

⁴⁴ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 25.

⁴⁵ Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 7.

executable operational design, and refined the design to produce the plan that set American military efforts on the path to achieve America's strategic goals.⁴⁶

Operation BLACKLIST's planners framed their problem based on the national strategic guidance that specified the desired state for a Japan in the post-war world and the conditions necessary for the United States to consider its bloody campaign to defeat Imperial Japan a success.⁴⁷ By late 1943, Allied strategic leaders recognized that occupation would either be accomplished through a costly opposed invasion of the Japanese home islands or after the collapse of Japanese will to resist prior to the Allied ground conquest of Japan due to prolonged strategic bombardment and blockade.⁴⁸ Operations OLYMPIC and CORONET, together known as Operation DOWNFALL, provided the operational plans for the expected massive invasions of first southern Japan (OLYMPIC) by U.S. Sixth Army, and then a climactic invasion of the Tokyo Plain by U.S. Eighth and First Armies (CORONET). The scale of both OLYMPIC and CORONET dwarfed the Normandy operation and all of the prior assaults in the Pacific theater. DOWNFALL included combat roles for over seven hundred thousand Allied soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.⁴⁹ Both plans included occupation roles and sectors for the armies after successful conclusion of major combat operations. Operation BLACKLIST used the same force pool, but provided for occupation of Japan without the massive Allied and Japanese casualties expected to result from DOWNFALL's combat.

⁴⁶ U.S. Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2008), 6-6,

⁴⁷ U.S. Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2008), 6-7.

⁴⁸ Louis Morton, *Strategy and Command: the First Two Years* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1962), 593.

⁴⁹ Manchester, *American Caesar*, 438.

BLACKLIST planners based their work on the policy outcomes resulting from the work of the SWNCC from 1942 through 1945.⁵⁰ Those aims were publicly stated later in three key documents: the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, SWNCC's policy statement 150/4 "U.S. Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan" publicized on September 22, 1945, and JCS directive number 1380/15 "Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government" to MacArthur made public in November 1945.⁵¹ These documents directed Allied forces to completely disarm Japan, to demobilize the Imperial Armed Forces, to oversee the repatriation of Allied and Japanese populations both in Japan and scattered across the former Japanese-occupied territories of the Pacific Theater, and to establish in Japan a peaceful post-war Japanese government and economy acceptable to the Allied Powers. U.S. strategic preparation for occupation of Japan set further conditions for BLACKLIST planners to incorporate. Chief among these were the availability of limited numbers military and civilian specialists for post-war administration of Japan. Planners also understood that the U.S. Army would lead the occupation because of a lack of capacity by other elements.⁵² Further, the occupation of Japan was intended by American policy makers to be an almost exclusively American endeavor unlike the planned occupation of a defeated Germany.⁵³ From the established desired state and conditions provided by American policymakers, the planners in MacArthur's headquarters framed the problems that Operation BLACKLIST was required to solve.

⁵⁰ Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 4.

⁵¹ Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 4.

⁵² Ibid., 25.

⁵³ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 69.

BLACKLIST planners formulated their design for occupation of Japan by determining to use an indirect approach to military governance of the defeated nation. Planners in Washington decided that an indirect approach to post-war administration of Japan was preferred as early as July 1944.⁵⁴ The United States lacked sufficient numbers of trained military and civilian specialists to directly run Japan at the national, prefecture, and local levels.⁵⁵ When the occupation actually began in August 1945, less than three hundred civil affairs officers with Japanese language and cultural training were available for deployment at the Civil Affairs Staging Area at the Presidio of Monterey, California.⁵⁶ SCAP assigned half of the officers to MG teams for the forty-seven prefectures and retained the remainder to occupy key staff sections at GHQ, army and corps levels.⁵⁷ Perhaps even more importantly, planners acknowledged that the massive language and cultural barriers to American rule of the historically closed Japanese nation could not likely be overcome. Therefore, U.S. planners intended to rule Japan indirectly through the existing Japanese institutions and Japanese nationals, including Emperor Hirohito.⁵⁸ This idea ran counter to public opinion in the United States. A 1945 Gallup poll disclosed that roughly 77% of Americans wanted the Japanese emperor to be severely punished for the attack on Pearl Harbor and the atrocities committed by

⁵⁴ Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 26.

⁵⁵ Beasley, *Modern History of Japan*, 126-27. Japan's forty-seven prefectures act as an intermediate level of civil governance similar to provinces in many western countries. They lack the elements of sovereignty present in the state governments of the United States.

⁵⁶ Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution*, 2.

⁵⁷ D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, v.3: *Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 40.

⁵⁸ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 11.

Japanese forces during their years of aggression.⁵⁹ GEN MacArthur, his staff, and like-minded officials in Washington like Under Secretary of State Grew successfully argued that retention of the Emperor would reduce likelihood of Japanese resistance and smooth implementation of American policy directives.⁶⁰ Retention of the existing Japanese governmental structure under the supervision of American military governance teams provided the most feasible method of stabilizing post-war Japan.

BLACKLIST planners emphasized stability mechanisms to subordinate units aimed at controlling the Japanese populace, supporting the development of post-war Japanese political and economic infrastructure to sustain peace in the Far East and influencing Japanese public opinion to support the occupation.⁶¹ The designated areas of operation and timeline for unit arrival in Japan placed Allied forces in control of over “60% of the population, 80% of the industrial capacity, and 48% of the food production” of Japan within two months of initiation.⁶² As directed by the SWNCC Policy 150/4 and JCS Directive 1380/15, BLACKLIST planners tasked MG teams with implementing widespread reforms of the Japanese governance, education, and economic systems at the local and prefecture levels to support development of a stable post-war Japan. Planners intended influence operations to begin immediately upon establishment of MacArthur’s headquarters in Japan using the existing newspapers and radio broadcasts to insure Japanese population compliance with GHQ directives.⁶³ Operation BLACKLIST focused

⁵⁹ Bix, *Hirohito*, 544.

⁶⁰ Duus, *Modern Japan*, 261.

⁶¹ U.S. Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2008), 6-10.

⁶² SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 6.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 34.

efforts on stability mechanisms to develop institutions necessary for long-term pacification of Japan.

With the indirect operational approach and stability mechanisms for Operation BLACKLIST established, MacArthur's planners refined the operational design with concepts for tempo of occupation, for command and control of occupation forces to ensure sufficient simultaneity of stability operations, and for phasing of operations based on main effort. GHQ recognized the uncertainty of complete Japanese compliance with Emperor Hirohito's directive to surrender and to cooperate with the occupation.⁶⁴ Consequently, Operation BLACKLIST aimed to demonstrate overwhelming American force as quickly as possible after Japanese capitulation. GHQ intended to land all of U.S. Sixth and Eighth Armies in three months while darkening Japan's skies with masses of American aircraft and ringing the its coast with Allied warships. The detailed landing plans with specific sectors of occupation assigned to each division ensured a high operational tempo to maintain order in the defeated nation and to deter any lingering thoughts of Japanese resistance. In addition to clear assignment of sectors of occupation to its subordinate armies, corps, and divisions, GHQ designated clear command relationships and roles as part of the operational plan. Particularly important was the separation of military governance teams from tactical units. GHQ and its subordinate armies established military governance staff sections down to the corps level and retained a direct line of command for MG units from the operational headquarters.⁶⁵ Tactical units were to be responsible only for security operations, while operational headquarters

⁶⁴ Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," *Military Review* 85, no. 3 (May/June 2005): 33.

⁶⁵ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 195-98.

oversaw efforts for other stability tasks. This reduced the likelihood of differing local commander interpretations of GHQ occupational policies and ensured a uniform standard for Japanese reforms across the force. Additionally, GHQ described Operation BLACKLIST as having two phases based on main effort.⁶⁶ In the first phase, American forces emphasized the establishment of security and the demobilization of the nearly 7 million Japanese service members still under arms. In the second phase, emphasis of the occupying force would shift to reforming Japanese political, economic, and social institutions to set conditions for a lasting peace. By refining the operational design with high-tempo landing of American force, a command structure that separated tactical units from governance teams, and phasing to ensure emphasis on specific sets of tasks, MacArthur's GHQ set conditions for successful occupation of Japan with Operation BLACKLIST.

The planners of Operation BLACKLIST succeeded in their tasks to frame the problems associated with occupying post-war Japan, to develop an effective operational design for indirectly administering the defeated nation, and to refine their design to set the best possible conditions for success. Operation BLACKLIST incorporated the strategic ends, ways, and means developed over several years by the United States for successful termination of the Pacific war. The plan translated America's strategic intentions into executable stability tasks for the units assigned for occupation duty. With Operation BLACKLIST, MacArthur's planners set conditions for a successful occupation that would transform Japan from an imperialistic power into a reliable post-war partner

⁶⁶ Joseph G. D. Babb, "Task Force Smith Revisited," *Military Review* 80, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 5.

for the United States. While its specifics reflect the unique conditions of its time and of devastated Japan, Operation BLACKLIST should be studied for lessons for future post-conflict stability operations planning.

Execution of Stability Operations

American forces in the Pacific Theater began execution of Operation BLACKLIST upon President Truman's announcement on August 15, 1945, that Imperial Japan had unconditionally surrendered in accordance with the terms of the Allied Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945.⁶⁷ Japan's capitulation followed the shocks of U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan on August 9, and the atomic bombing of Nagasaki on the same day. GEN MacArthur was named Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the occupation of Japan on August 15. He immediately issued orders to his subordinate commands to cancel Operation CORONET and to begin execution of the version of Operation BLACKLIST published on August 8. That version, called "Baker Sixty," directed air-landing of initial forces in the Tokyo area to be spearheaded by the 11th Airborne Division.⁶⁸

MacArthur directed the Imperial Japanese forces to dispatch a mission to his headquarters at Manila, the Philippines, to receive detailed instructions for the arrival of American occupation forces. This mission arrived August 19 and returned to Japan the next day to begin preparations that included the disarming of Japanese forces in the Tokyo area. While American naval and air forces enforced the ceasefire through massive

⁶⁷ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964), 264-265.

⁶⁸ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 12-17.

presence patrols, the arrival of the vanguard of American forces at Atsugi Airfield south of Tokyo was delayed by poor weather until August 28.⁶⁹ Combat formations of the 11th Airborne arrived on August 30, and initial elements of 4th Regimental Combat Team, 6th Marine Division came ashore on the same day.⁷⁰ By the conduct of official surrender ceremony on the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Harbor on September 2, there were over four thousand American troops on the ground. Both the SCAP and Eighth Army Headquarters had been established in Japan.⁷¹ MacArthur and occupation troops of the 1st Cavalry Division triumphantly entered Tokyo on September 8.⁷²

The buildup of American ground, air and naval forces accelerated after the surrender ceremonies. Eighth Army units began to flood central and northern Japan, and plans for entrance of the Sixth Army into southern Japan were accelerated. Sixth Army made initial landings on September 25 in southern Kyushu. Its headquarters was established in historic Kyoto by September 27.⁷³ The last Eighth Army unit assumed its occupation position on October 14, and the final element of Sixth Army was in place by the end of the month.⁷⁴ U.S. Army end strength in Japan topped out at approximately

⁶⁹ E.M. Flanagan, *The Angels: A History of the 11th Airborne Division* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 371. Atsugi Airfield had served as a *Kamikaze* base during the last year of the war. Both American and Japanese military leaders feared that fanatics would attack GEN MacArthur when he landed there. LTG Eichelberger, MacArthur's staff, and the Japanese officials sent to coordinate the start of the occupation urged GEN MacArthur to land elsewhere. GEN MacArthur overruled them all, preferring the symbolism of his publicized arrival at that location.

⁷⁰ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 28.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁷² James, *Years of MacArthur*, 1.

⁷³ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 47.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 53.

355,000.⁷⁵ U.S. ground forces were organized into two field armies with six corps made up of sixteen divisions and other support units.

In accordance with U.S. Congressional directives to begin demobilization, reduction in structure and troop levels began almost immediately after this high point was reached.⁷⁶ Eighth Army rotated over thirty thousand Soldiers home to the United States by the end of 1945. Sixth Army transferred responsibility to Eighth Army on December 31, 1945, and the organization was deactivated on January 26, 1946. By mid-1946, the steady-state organizational structure for the occupation was reached. Eighth Army served as the operational-level headquarters for the remainder of the occupation under the strategic direction of MacArthur's SCAP.⁷⁷ Three corps-level organizations divided Japan into areas of tactical responsibility. I Corps with 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions controlled the majority of southern and central Japan. IX Corps with the 1st Cavalry and 11th Airborne Division controlled the Tokyo region and regions north. The British Commonwealth Occupation Forces (BCOF) made up of 40,236 Australian, British, New Zealander, Indian, and other Commonwealth troops controlled the island of Shikoku and southern quarter of Honshu by mid-1946.⁷⁸ Combined troop strength for all elements remained below 200,000 for the remainder of the occupation, and dropped as low as 50,000 in 1948.⁷⁹ All of the American combat formations redeployed for combat in

⁷⁵ John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2006), 28.

⁷⁶ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 57.

⁷⁷ Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, 270.

⁷⁸ McGrath, *Boots on the Ground*, 28.

⁷⁹ Paul Chwiakowski, *In Caesar's Shadow: The Life of General Robert Eichelberger* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 155.

Korea beginning in 1950.⁸⁰ Civil servants, often deactivated occupation Soldiers, filled many positions in specialty sections like military governance, but their numbers amounted to only a small fraction of the total Allied occupation force.⁸¹

Operation BLACKLIST's planners envisioned the transformation of Japan occurring in phases with activities occurring across sectors similar to those identified in the current FM 3-07.⁸² Efforts across all five sectors occurred from the beginning of the occupation in 1945 until its official end with the April 1952 ratification of the San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951.⁸³ Initial responses by American forces focused on deployment of Allied troops, demilitarization of Japan, and reduction of human suffering on the islands. These activities correspond to efforts to establish civil security, civil control, and essential services. The second phase of the occupation emphasized transformative programs related to support to governance and economic reform. MacArthur's staff identified early 1946 as the time of significant transition from the initial phase to the transformative phase.⁸⁴ Allied actions within each sector demonstrated effective execution of stability operations in a complex post-conflict environment.

⁸⁰ Eighth U.S. Army, *The Amphibious Eighth* (Japan: Boonjudo Printing Works), 33.

⁸¹ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 85.

⁸² SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 57.

⁸³ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxv.

⁸⁴ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 57.

Execution: Civil Security

MacArthur's planners set establishment of a secure operating environment for American occupation forces in Japan as the first priority of Operation BLACKLIST. Current U.S. Army doctrine similarly places civil security, which is the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the population and stabilizing forces, as the necessary basis for all other stability tasks.⁸⁵ John Paul Vann, a senior American civil servant during the later Vietnam War, argued that during occupations "whether security is ten percent of the total problem or ninety percent, it is inescapably the first ten percent or first ninety percent."⁸⁶ American occupation forces ensured security by quickly establishing an overwhelming presence to deter potential Japanese resistance, by forcing the rapid demobilization of the remaining Imperial forces, and by destroying Japan's stockpiles of war materiel.

Senior Allied leaders including GEN MacArthur and his staff felt that the overwhelming presence of American military power throughout Japan was necessary to deter threats to occupying forces during the critical first months after termination of the conflict.⁸⁷ The first named task for MacArthur's forces in JCS Directive 1380/15 was to enforce the cessation of hostilities.⁸⁸ GHQ recognized that even with the Japanese emperor's directive to stop fighting, elements of the Japanese military and the population might attempt to continue the conflict. In fact, fanatical junior officers in the Japanese

⁸⁵ U.S. Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2008), 3-2.

⁸⁶ Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet: the Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 283.

⁸⁷ Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 33.

⁸⁸ Martin, *Allied Occupation of Japan*, 124.

Army attempted to seize the Emperor, take power, and then resist the occupation forces just days after the surrender was announced; this effort was narrowly defeated by loyal elements of the Japanese armed forces.⁸⁹ With such a volatile environment, MacArthur and his staff sought to quickly and visibly build American combat power within Japanese population centers. Veteran combat units led by the 11th Airborne Division flowed into Japan ready to fight.⁹⁰ Simultaneously, Marine and Army forces came rapidly ashore and linked up with the airborne forces, and began patrolling throughout the capital region.⁹¹ MacArthur established his headquarters at the highly visible Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance Company Building overlooking the Imperial Palace by mid-month.⁹² By the end of October, MacArthur's forces had completed their deployment across every prefecture of Japan.⁹³ Allied ground, sea, and air elements in large numbers unequivocally demonstrated the futility of continued Japanese resistance even to the most fanatical elements of Japanese society. The rapid deployment of well-supplied Allied combat forces also reinforced directives by Emperor Hirohito and the Japanese government to cease hostilities and comply with American occupational authority.⁹⁴ The overwhelming show of Allied force throughout the Japanese home islands contributed to the deterrence of violence and ensured the cessation of hostilities. The readiness of American commands to rapidly execute the occupation in accordance with the detailed

⁸⁹ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 56.

⁹⁰ Flanagan, *The Angels*, 371.

⁹¹ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 28.

⁹² Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die – The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, MA: Adams Media, 1996), 481.

⁹³ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 65.

⁹⁴ Duus, *Modern Japan*, 257.

Operation BLACKLIST design proved decisive in securing the termination of World War II.

Simultaneously with the deployment of massive American combat power, MacArthur's command moved to establish civil security by quickly demobilizing the Imperial Japanese armed forces. When Emperor Hirohito broadcast Japan's unconditional surrender, Japan still had approximately 6,983,000 men under arms across the Pacific theater of operations.⁹⁵ The Japanese government began the demobilization process even before the arrival of American troops in Japan. American forces quickly moved to secure demobilization sites and to verify all prior actions taken by the Japanese government. American infantry regiments fanned out to Japanese military installations, secured weapons as they were turned in by the disbanding Imperial units, and seized vital records to ensure full Japanese compliance with the terms of surrender.⁹⁶ Additionally, Allied forces coordinated the return of Japanese servicemen from overseas locations, including over a million men from both China and Southeast Asia. Both Allied and surviving Japanese shipping transported war-weary Japanese back to the home islands. American MG teams received the overseas contingents as they arrived at ports around Japan. Once received, the MG units processed returning Japanese through significant medical and administrative screening to prevent the spread of communicable disease to the devastated Japanese population. While nearly all Japanese service members in areas occupied by American, British, or Commonwealth forces were returned home and demobilized by the end of 1946, those Japanese captured by either the Soviets or Chinese Communists

⁹⁵ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 285.

⁹⁶ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 119.

suffered much slower returns.⁹⁷ Over three hundred thousand Japanese overrun by Soviet forces remained unaccounted for in 1949. A large number never returned despite the repeated efforts of GEN MacArthur and American authorities.⁹⁸ Overall, the demobilization of Japan's armed forces went very smoothly because of the strong cooperation between Japanese and American authorities. GEN MacArthur was able to speed up the redeployment of occupying American troops back to the United States because of the overwhelming success of the demobilization efforts to build post-war civil security in Japan.⁹⁹

As Japanese forces quickly demobilized, Allied elements worked furiously to destroy the vast amounts of war materiel left by the disarmed Imperial forces. American tactical units secured the stockpiles of Japanese arms and the remaining military production facilities that had survived Allied bombing raids.¹⁰⁰ Ordnance teams and quartermaster units loaded small arms, crew-served weapons, and huge stores of ordinance onto Navy ships and landing craft. The sailors dumped the stocks into the ocean.¹⁰¹ Larger end-items, like over 10,000 airplanes and 3,000 tanks, were gathered together and then burned by American units.¹⁰² Combat units like the 1st Cavalry Division were actively engaged in the dangerous work, particularly the safeguarding and

⁹⁷ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 92.

⁹⁸ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 52-53.

⁹⁹ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 56.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁰² Chwiakowski, *In Caesar's Shadow*, 152.

disposal of Japan's chemical weapons stockpiles.¹⁰³ MG teams inventoried weapons factories and then sent the machine tools to Allied nations like China as war reparations in accordance with the articles of surrender. Similarly, the warships of the Imperial fleet were scrapped and their materials were shipped abroad to fuel the industries of both Allied nations and Japan.¹⁰⁴ By the end of 1946, the majority of work needed to destroy Japan's arsenal of war materiel was completed.¹⁰⁵ American occupation forces greatly enabled the establishment of civil security in Japan by destroying the arms and equipment that potential insurgents could have used for violent action.

Operation BLACKLIST's planners set the establishment of civil security as the priority effort for American forces in the first phase of the occupation of Japan. American forces succeeded in setting this vital condition for prolonged peace by rapidly establishing overwhelming Allied combat power on the Japanese home islands, speedily disbanding the Imperial Japanese armed forces, and destroying Japan's stockpiles of war materiel. With the cooperation of the Japanese government, the Allied forces solidly established a safe and secure environment ahead of even the most optimistic pre-surrender timetables. American forces effectively turned their efforts from combat operations to executing security tasks with necessary thoroughness, restraint, and professional competence.¹⁰⁶ The operational forces of the American occupation set the

¹⁰³ Bertram C. Wright, *The 1st Cavalry Division in World War II* (Tokyo: Toppan Printing, 1947), 208.

¹⁰⁴ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 87.

¹⁰⁵ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 142.

¹⁰⁶ David P. Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition between Combat Operations and Stability Operations*, Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 7 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005), 9.

conditions for lasting peace by quickly establishing the necessary initial condition of civil security.

Execution: Civil Control

While establishment of civil security was the first priority for American occupation units in the initial phases of Operation BLACKLIST, the American forces also initiated efforts in other stability sectors upon arrival. Allied commanders recognized the need to retain and bolster civil control to prevent anarchy from breaking out in shattered Japan. Civil control tasks are essential to establishing or maintaining the rule of law in territory to be stabilized by military forces.¹⁰⁷ Operation BLACKLIST placed chief responsibility for civil control tasks on the operational units of the occupation, the Sixth and Eighth Armies. After the inactivation of Sixth Army in early 1946, Eighth Army oversaw most civil control supporting actions in Japan. Eighth Army effectively maintained civil control in Japan through maintenance and reform of the Japanese law enforcement apparatus, reform of the Japanese judicial and corrections systems, and support to war crimes tribunals. Eighth Army's actions prevented Japan from descending into chaos after the war while providing conditions to support the growth of legitimate democratic institutions in Japan.

American operational planners decided to retain the existing Japanese law enforcement apparatus. In doing so, the American forces mitigated the opportunity for criminal elements to take advantage of the breakdown of civil order inherent to Japan's defeat and humiliation. In addition, the continued presence of ninety-four thousand

¹⁰⁷ U.S. Army, FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2008), 3-5.

Japanese police on street corners around the country and engaged in enforcing laws passed by the Japanese government reflected the indirect nature of the occupation.¹⁰⁸ While numerous, U.S. forces could not have effectively policed the home islands unassisted for a number of reasons, not the least of which was that very few American Soldiers spoke or read Japanese. American tactical units were generally not involved in the day-to-day policing of Japan.¹⁰⁹ SCAP orders placed the existing Japanese law enforcement elements, from local police units to the Ministry of Interior, under the direct supervision of the SCAP Civil Intelligence Section (CIS) and elements of the Eighth Army G2 Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC).¹¹⁰ Teams from Eighth Army's 4,700 American counterintelligence and military police Soldiers oversaw the over 94,000 Japanese police officers to prevent brutality as much as possible through inspections, partnering at the prefecture level, and local patrolling. This improved the effectiveness of Japanese authorities while not undermining their legitimacy. The Eighth Army Public Safety Division established training centers for police across the country and retrained police officers to reduce incidents of brutality and corruption common under the old Imperial system.¹¹¹ Military governance units provided a second nationwide set of observers and also reported perceptions of police effectiveness gained from local populations.¹¹² American forces reinforced the Japanese security forces at times when

¹⁰⁸ McGrath, *Boots on the Ground*, 31.

¹⁰⁹ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 85.

¹¹⁰ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 86.

¹¹¹ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 247.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 220.

riots, mobs, or criminal gangs overwhelmed local police capabilities.¹¹³ Crime and particularly the black market economy were widespread in Japan, but criminal activity never reached levels that threatened to topple the Japanese post-war government.¹¹⁴ Eighth Army's effective use of the Japanese law enforcement apparatus was critical to stabilizing Japan during the American occupation because it provided sufficient policing force density to prevent the country from falling into chaos while supporting the intended indirect American control of the population.

Similar to efforts to reform the Japanese police, Eighth Army was also responsible for widespread efforts to reform the Japanese judicial and corrections programs. Reform of the justice system in accordance with policy guidance from the American government and SCAP started in earnest in 1946 as a principal effort during the second phase of Operation BLACKLIST.¹¹⁵ While SCAP directed changes to the Japanese civil and criminal legal code through directives to Japanese national government, Eighth Army's military governance teams were tasked to monitor the implementation of reforms at the local and prefecture levels.¹¹⁶ The MG sections at the army and corps levels compiled field reports from the teams and directed corrective action if needed. The staff elements also forwarded positive and negative feedback on implementation back to SCAP as a guide for further policy directives. The Japanese corrections system required significant overhaul to reach standards of humane care of

¹¹³ Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road to Tokyo*, 274.

¹¹⁴ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 85.

¹¹⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 301.

¹¹⁶ Chwiakowski, *In Caesar's Shadow*, 151.

inmates acceptable to the American authorities.¹¹⁷ In addition to significant retraining of Japanese corrections officers, the American occupation authorities directed the construction of additional prisons to U.S. standards to reduce overcrowding.¹¹⁸ Judicial reforms overseen by Eighth Army centered on the reduction of corruption, improvement in standards of evidence and trial counsel, and improved throughput of the judicial system to reduce backlog.¹¹⁹ Overall, Eighth Army's reform efforts in both the judicial and correction systems had long-term effects on Japanese society, raising standards and popular confidence in governmental systems.

One of the most controversial programs of the American occupation of Japan was the war-crimes trials conducted by SCAP and enabled by Eighth Army support.¹²⁰ While war-crimes tribunals are necessary for conflict termination, historical review has raised serious questions over the fairness of the tribunals primarily conducted by the Allies in Japan from the end of 1945 to 1949.¹²¹ Allied policy made clear to the Japanese that judgment would be passed in the post-war period on the numerous atrocities committed by Imperial forces during their offensives across the Pacific and East Asia.¹²² The American public demanded that Japanese leaders be held accountable for the brutal treatment of American and allied prisoners of war, not to mention the indiscriminate and widespread killing of civilians by Japanese forces in China and elsewhere. However,

¹¹⁷ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 220.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹¹⁹ Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution*, 42-43.

¹²⁰ Joseph G.D. Babb, "The Occupation of Japan – Legacy for the Cold War and Beyond," *Military Review* 76, no.2 (March/April 1996), 99.

¹²¹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 447.

¹²² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 295.

when SCAP and Eighth Army conducted the long-expected trials, irregularities were highlighted by both Japanese and American critics.¹²³ In some cases, Japanese senior officers were seemingly held to account for actions they did not participate in. In other cases, standards of evidence and for guilt seemed to be inadequate.¹²⁴ Some Americans were greatly disappointed by the policy decision that removed Emperor Hirohito from the list of those accused.¹²⁵ Perhaps the best that can be said for the Tokyo War Crimes Trials is that they were conducted without causing or allowing disruption of the Japanese society, and then they were concluded in 1949.¹²⁶ While very imperfect, the American occupation authority's conduct of war crimes trials helped stabilize the post-conflict environment by providing a public accounting for the atrocities committed by Imperial forces.

By maintaining and controlling the Japanese law enforcement apparatus, reforming the Japanese judicial and corrections systems, and conducting needed war crimes trials, the American occupation forces established and maintained needed civil control to further stabilization of Japan after the war. Eighth Army, as the principle operational level headquarters, oversaw directly most of these tasks over the seven years of the occupation. In doing so, Eighth Army prevented a collapse of Japanese society after its crushing defeat and began transformative reforms in civil control that supported the growth of Japan into a peaceful free-market democracy.

¹²³ Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 6.

¹²⁴ Manchester, *American Caesar*, 486.

¹²⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 257-58.

¹²⁶ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 510.

Execution: Essential Services

When the American forces arrived in late August 1945, they found a Japan on the verge of collapse because its people were starving and homeless. Japan could not sustain either its population or its industries with domestic resources.¹²⁷ Allies unrestricted submarine warfare had annihilated the Japanese cargo fleet while the majority of domestic food production had been allocated to sustain the Imperial armed forces. The Japanese people were left with very little. Adding to the people's suffering, Allied strategic bombing had leveled 40% of Japan's sixty-six major cities.¹²⁸ Even without counting the unprecedented devastation of the two atomic bombs, American Army Air Corps evaluators rated sixty-six major Japanese cities between 30% and 100% destroyed during post-war tours.¹²⁹ Over one in ten Japanese was homeless, with over nine million of Japan's seventy-four million citizens driven from their homes by the destruction.¹³⁰ The homeless lived in squalor and, weakened by malnutrition, were on the verge of succumbing to epidemics of communicable diseases.¹³¹ Added to the massive internally displaced persons problem, millions of Japanese civilians were trapped outside Japan by the collapse of Imperial forces. Worse, millions of non-Japanese forced labors had been imported to the home islands over the three decades of Japanese imperialism. The vast majorities of both of these externally displaced populations wanted to return home.

Eighth Army and the other operational forces of the American occupation moved quickly

¹²⁷ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 5.

¹²⁸ Thomas W. Zeiler, *Unconditional Defeat – Japan, America, and the End of World War II* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2004), 192.

¹²⁹ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 45-46.

¹³⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 76.

¹³¹ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 276.

to further a lasting secure post-war environment by easing the humanitarian suffering of the Japanese people with quick food aid, widespread medical action, and a sustained systematic relocation of internally and externally displaced populations.

When the occupying armies of the Allies arrived in Japan, Soldiers immediately set to work improving the availability of food to the Japanese people. After the surrender, the Japanese government began stockpiling food for the incoming Allied forces. In areas conquered by the Japanese, local populations had been compelled to provide supplies to the Japanese forces regardless of the hardship placed on the local civilians.¹³² One of the first acts of the American commanders at all levels was to assure the Japanese authorities that the occupation forces were completely self-sufficient and to release stockpiled food to the civilian population immediately. GEN MacArthur also directed that 3.5 million tons of rations built-up in American depots to sustain Operation DOWNFALL be distributed to the Japanese people through U.S. field kitchens and units.¹³³ GHQ standing orders forbid Soldiers in many locations to purchase food outside their garrisons.¹³⁴ Eighth Army also began distributing additional rations to local populations after American units began redeploying.¹³⁵ American forces restored importation of foodstuffs as the first kind of foreign trade allowed after the occupation.¹³⁶ All foreign commerce was tightly controlled by the occupation and directly monitored by MG teams until

¹³² MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 285.

¹³³ Manchester, *American Caesar*, 465.

¹³⁴ John Curtis Perry, *Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1980), 197.

¹³⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 144.

¹³⁶ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 213.

restoration of Japanese sovereignty in 1952.¹³⁷ Dedicated efforts by American forces were essential to staving off widespread starvation by the Japanese civilian population after conflict termination, and the goodwill generated by the humanitarian activities greatly aided in rebuilding a stable environment in Japan.

Similarly, American efforts to provide medical care to the Japanese population to combat a rising tide of disease in the devastated nation were essential to stabilizing the post-war environment. Widespread homelessness, lack of adequate food, destruction of public sanitation services and disrupted medical systems left the Japanese people very vulnerable to epidemics. In the waning days of the war, outbreaks of cholera and tuberculosis began to take their toll.¹³⁸ American forces took immediate actions to begin redressing the problems. First, MG teams assessed medical and sanitary services at the local and prefecture levels. Based on those reports, Eighth Army focused health services resources on areas most in need.¹³⁹ American field hospitals and medical teams provided emergency services when needed. Medical elements attached to MG teams screened transient populations, such as repatriated Imperial soldiers in the process of demobilizing, to quarantine the infected before they could spread diseases.¹⁴⁰ To transform the environment over time, GHQ directed reconstruction efforts by the Japanese government. Eighth Army MG elements monitored these efforts and insured proper standards were met.¹⁴¹ Through these and other efforts, American occupation forces prevented epidemics

¹³⁷ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 23.

¹³⁸ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 276-77.

¹³⁹ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 60.

¹⁴⁰ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 276.

¹⁴¹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 312-13.

in the immediate post-conflict period and reduced potential for future instability in Japan by guiding the government to provide adequate care for the population.

Perhaps the most difficult humanitarian crisis facing the occupation forces in the post-conflict environment was the presence of massive displaced civilian populations in Japan and in its former possessions. In conjunction with efforts to repatriate Allied prisoners of war and the defeated armed forces of Japan, American commanders and staffs organized a massive system to identify, screen, and transport home the millions of stranded Japanese and other nations' citizens in the first years of the peace. MG teams played key roles in these efforts. On the ground in Japan, MG teams sought to identify the sheer numbers of both internally and externally displaced persons. The teams led Japanese government elements to care for the groups to meet immediate needs and then to coordinate transport. MG teams and other American elements oversaw the construction of refugee camps to house the numbers of displaced persons.¹⁴² At ports of embarkation and debarkation in Japan and abroad, Allied teams medically screened those being returned home and made efforts to provide transport aboard commercial and military vessels that met at least minimum humanitarian standards. The lives of the nearly 3 million Japanese refugees returning from former conquests were miserable, with families separated and prospects on return to Japan uncertain.¹⁴³ Similarly, over 2 million Koreans and Chinese faced massive discrimination while still in Japan and difficult circumstances once returned to their former home countries.¹⁴⁴ But Allied efforts to care for these

¹⁴² SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 209.

¹⁴³ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 54.

¹⁴⁴ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 530-31.

displaced persons and to return them home to restart their lives provided some hope and prevented the worst outcomes of the widespread refugee problem. Eighth Army military governance teams and other Allied elements provided vital transformative actions in relieving the pressures of the massive post-war displaced persons crisis. In doing so, the American forces set better conditions for a stable environment not just in Japan but also in all of East Asia.

American operational commands and occupation forces were faced with tremendous challenges in meeting the essential service requirements of the civilian populations in Japan upon arrival in August 1945. Guided by the framework of Operation BLACKLIST, Allied forces took immediate action to relieve widespread crises with food shortages, potential for epidemics, and vulnerable populations of displaced persons. As the occupation progressed, American forces at all levels took transformative systematic steps to reduce sources of instability from these and other humanitarian issues. The Eighth Army set conditions for sustained peace through deliberate engagement with the post-war Japanese government to meet the needs of the civilian population for essential services.

Execution: Support to Governance

The American Government and GHQ engineered the most transformative effects of Japanese society within the realm of governance. The American occupational authority wrote the 1947 Constitution that still provides the framework for the government of Japan, its limits, and the rights of its citizens.¹⁴⁵ While the existing structures of Japanese

¹⁴⁵ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 235.

governance were retained to sustain the nation, the relationships between the monarchy, the government, and the Japanese people were radically changed by MacArthur, his advisors, and the U.S. government.¹⁴⁶ The idealism of the American occupational policymakers is reflected in the Constitution of Japan. The Emperor of Japan was compelled by the Allies to renounce his status as a living god.¹⁴⁷ Japanese women were enfranchised for the first time in history and provided a place in society very different than in pre-war Japan.¹⁴⁸ The Americans forced the Japanese people, steeped in a warrior tradition, to renounce offensive war in Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution.¹⁴⁹ As these transformative policies were handled down from GHQ to the Japanese government, the operational forces under Eighth Army were tasked to monitor the compliance of local governments and individual Japanese citizens with these unprecedented changes. Eighth Army and its military governance teams set conditions for long-term adoption of these policies by purging the Japanese government of radical elements and by ensuring the safe local exercise of new individual liberties during the elections conducted during the occupation.

Eighth Army elements sought to separate radical elements and individuals from popular influence by identifying them and purging them from positions of public life.

Several authoritarian groups that included paramilitary organizations like the *Kokuryu*

¹⁴⁶ Bix, *Hirohito*, 13.

¹⁴⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 282.

¹⁴⁸ Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 38.

¹⁴⁹ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 303. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.”

Kai (Black Dragon Society) and brutal state security services like the *Tokumu Kikan* (Secret Intelligence Service) had controlled the population of Imperial Japan.¹⁵⁰

Identification of members of these repressive organizations was a significant line of effort for the intelligence bureaus of GHQ and Eighth Army.¹⁵¹ With the help of pre-conflict termination intelligence and the compliance of Japanese citizens, American forces successfully singled-out many of the individuals involved in repression of the population during the war. American forces screened over 700,000 Japanese and barred 200,000 members of militarist organizations from service in government in post-war Japan.¹⁵²

Military governance teams enforced these bans at the local and prefecture levels through observation and reporting to Eighth Army. Teams would alert GHQ of any non-compliance, and American authorities would compel the Japanese government to make any corrections necessary.¹⁵³ Similarly, MG teams would monitor local government actions for indications of rise of new radicals, whether militarist or communist in nature. MG teams and other elements of in direct contact with the population provided close monitoring of the occupational environment. With daily feedback provided by these teams from all areas of Japan, GHQ succeeded in preventing radicalization of post-war Japan.¹⁵⁴ Eighth Army and its operational elements successfully purged Japanese political life of radical actors through constant vigilance. The American forces thus set

¹⁵⁰ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 231.

¹⁵¹ Crane, "Phase IV Operations," 33.

¹⁵² Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 517

¹⁵³ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 117.

¹⁵⁴ Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 269.

conditions for stable governance and development of democratic institutions by steadily removing sources of disruption that could have derailed U.S. transformative efforts.

Eighth Army's military governance teams also played a vital role in ensuring the free exercise of constitutional individual liberties in daily life. MG teams particularly focused on successful implementation of reforms to ensure free and fair elections during the occupation.¹⁵⁵ MG elements conducted widespread campaigns to educate the public on their rights under the 1947 Constitution.¹⁵⁶ Americans from GHQ also conducted voter registration drives targeting women to insure the fully representative intent of GHQ reformers was fulfilled.¹⁵⁷ Governance teams oversaw all elections during the occupation.¹⁵⁸ They reported any irregularities through Eighth Army to GHQ, and GHQ directed immediate corrective action through the Japanese national government agencies. American observers at the local level, including patrols from occupation units like the 24th Infantry Division, also ensured that popular demonstrations were not suppressed by government security forces but also did not threaten the stability of the environment.¹⁵⁹ Similarly, Eighth Army Soldiers provided security for candidates that were threatened by Communist agitators.¹⁶⁰ American intelligence elements worked through Japanese security forces to remove radicalizing elements to prevent demonstrations from becoming

¹⁵⁵ Eighth U.S. Army, *Amphibious Eighth*, 38.

¹⁵⁶ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 206-7

¹⁵⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 185.

¹⁵⁸ Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution*, 11.

¹⁵⁹ 24th Infantry Division, *Occupational History of the 24th Infantry Division for February – June 1946* (LaCrosse, WI: Brookhaven Press, 2003), 12.

¹⁶⁰ Chwiakowski, *In Caesar's Shadow*, 156.

destabilizing to the government or paralyzing to essential services.¹⁶¹ Efforts by MG teams and other occupational elements provided a safe environment for the Japanese people to gain confidence in their constitutional liberties. These efforts also prevented early abuses that could have undermined the government's structure. Eighth Army's actions throughout the seven-year occupation of Japan provided conditions that allowed the steady growth of a stable civil society in post-war period.

American occupational forces transformed Japan considerably through radical changes to its governance. Allied forces provided the safe and secure environment that allowed the democratic reforms embodied in the 1947 Constitution to take solid root in Japanese society. Without the purge of radical elements and the safeguarding of practice of individual liberties provided by American teams, Japan's new liberal democracy and constitutional government could easily have collapsed in the turmoil. While U.S. military forces did not allow complete freedom of action by the Japanese, the Americans fostered liberty through institutional reform and oversight of policy implementation. The stability of Japanese democracy over the past sixty years was directly due to the steady efforts of Americans during the seven years of occupation.

Execution: Support to Economic Development

Reform of the economic infrastructure and conditions for Japan was a principal aim of the American occupation strategy. Both SWNCC Policy 150/4 and JCS Directive 1380/15 set "defeudalization" of the Japanese economy as a key task for GHQ.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 267.

¹⁶² Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 354.

Strategic planners in Washington felt that Imperial Japan's centralized economy that placed near-total control of the means of production in the hands of "giant family monopolies" called *Zaibatsu* had led in significant part to the nation's imperialist expansion.¹⁶³ Reformers in Washington and at GHQ, including GEN MacArthur himself, saw economic reforms in favor of individual citizens and free markets as vital to lasting democratic change in Japan.¹⁶⁴ Conditions in post-war Japan were also favorable to sweeping reform with the devastation of the country requiring a near-complete rebuilding of the Japanese economy. Accordingly, SCAP initiated sweeping reforms of the Japanese economy through a number of policy directives and directed acts of the Japanese legislature, the *Diet*. Concerns about growing communist influences and the need to more rapidly reenergize Japan as a free-market partner to the United States for the Cold War caused a "reverse course" from the most progressive of these reforms by 1948.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless, SCAP polices directed an irreversible shift in Japanese economic conditions that fostered an aggressive market-share driven capitalist society. Eighth Army, and particularly its military governance infrastructure, ensured nationwide implementation of SCAP's reforms. MG teams oversaw the implementation of the SCAP economic reform program centered on three pillars: breakup of the *Zaibatsu*, the Japanese government's efforts to introduce needed land reforms, and the formation of labor movements as productive participants in Japanese economic and political life.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ U.S. Eighth Army, *Amphibious Eighth*, 37.

¹⁶⁴ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 310.

¹⁶⁵ Eleanor M. Hadley, "From Deconcentration to Reverse Course in Japan," in *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952*, ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 148.

¹⁶⁶ David P. Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done*, 40.

In accordance with U.S. policy directives, SCAP ordered the breakup of the *Zaibatsu* and the creation of anti-trust mechanisms by the Japanese government. Initial efforts centered on a voluntary dissolution of the large conglomerates initiated under an October 1945 plan proposed by then Japanese Prime Minister Yasuda.¹⁶⁷ After this plan proved ineffective, more binding anti-trust efforts were enacted through the “Anti-Monopoly Law” passed by the *Diet* on March 12, 1947.¹⁶⁸ Under both reform programs, Eighth Army MG teams and staffs monitored efforts at the local and prefecture levels. The Economics Division of the army’s Military Governance staff section was responsible for oversight of Japanese industries, commerce organizations, and labor practices.¹⁶⁹ Additionally, the Finance and Civil Property Division enforced a SCAP ban on *Zaibatsu* activities by monitoring the activities of 1,137 SCAP-identified restricted firms, 1,621 of their subsidiaries and 907 businesses that were affiliated with the conglomerates.¹⁷⁰ U.S. policies shifted in 1948 away from trust-busting and toward intensive economic recovery programs that viewed large-scale corporations as engines of Japanese economic independence.¹⁷¹ As the eyes of SCAP’s economic efforts, MG teams and staffs were instrumental in the successful reduction of monopolistic activity and establishment of positive environment for new businesses in Japan to prevent the destabilization of the post-war economy.

¹⁶⁷ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 335.

¹⁶⁸ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 336.

¹⁶⁹ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 202.

¹⁷⁰ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 360.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 410.

Another critical reform of the Japanese economy was the implementation of agricultural land reform, and MG teams assisted this effort through local oversight of government programs. In pre-occupation Japan, a landlord class provided strong support to the militarists. The landlords often left farm workers in crushing poverty through confiscation of harvests.¹⁷² As a pillar of economic reform, SCAP and the Japanese government implemented several land reform actions that placed Japan's limited fertile land into the hands of the people who actually grew the crops. MG teams assisted local governments in identifying lands for purchase and redistribution. Military and civilian experts from the teams also provided instruction and materials assistance.¹⁷³ As demilitarization proceeded, American forces released former Japanese military airfields to be reutilized as farm land. Additionally, American elements oversaw the creation of land commissions at the local, prefecture, and national levels with guaranteed representation for tenant farms and small farm owners.¹⁷⁴ Effects of MG team-overseen land reforms were dramatic, with 90% of all agricultural land cultivated by individual growers by the end of the occupation.¹⁷⁵ Eighth Army governance teams' support to agricultural development programs not only supported Japanese economic revitalization but also strengthened the confidence of citizens in the efficacy of the post-war democracy.

In addition to anti-trust legislation and land reform, SCAP implemented progressive programs supportive of workers' rights and organized labor. MG teams and

¹⁷² Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 521.

¹⁷³ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 212.

¹⁷⁴ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 344.

¹⁷⁵ Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die*, 521.

staffs monitored developments under these programs and the associated Japanese governmental reforms closely. GEN MacArthur openly encouraged the establishment of trade unions as “schoolhouses of democracy.”¹⁷⁶ MG teams reported effects of these policies through the Labor subsection of Eighth Army’s Military Governance Economic Division.¹⁷⁷ By late 1946, membership in over 17,200 local unions had risen ten-fold from prewar estimates to over 4,850,000.¹⁷⁸ MG teams were influential in regulating the activities of these unions to prevent disruption of the nascent Japanese economy. While labor unions provided a key venue for working-class Japanese to have a greater role in Japan’s economic and political leadership, they also provided an opportunity for radicals to make demands that neither the Japanese government nor industry could fulfill.¹⁷⁹ Counterintelligence teams also played a role, particularly as infiltration of the unions by communist agitators became suspected in 1946.¹⁸⁰ GEN MacArthur intervened to stop a potentially destructive general strike organized for February 1, 1947.¹⁸¹ Eighth Army military police and counterintelligence teams were openly prepared to break the strike with force.¹⁸² This event marked a turning point for occupational economic policies and came at similar time for other “reverse course” initiatives that tempered initial progressive reforms with conservative adjustments needed to retain stability.¹⁸³ GHQ set

¹⁷⁶ Duus, *Modern Japan*, 265.

¹⁷⁷ SCAP, *Reports of General MacArthur*, 216.

¹⁷⁸ James, *Years of MacArthur*, 176.

¹⁷⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 239.

¹⁸⁰ Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 315.

¹⁸¹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 293.

¹⁸² Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 319.

¹⁸³ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 455.

limits through *Diet* legislation for both government and labor to ensure the steady transformation of Japan with lasting fundamental political, economic and social reforms.¹⁸⁴ The operational forces of Eighth Army were instrumental in setting a stable post-war environment through their efforts related to labor movements.

Army Military Governance personnel were principal overseers of economic reforms that reduced the power of the *Zaibatsu* conglomerates, democratized Japanese agriculture with land reform, and empowered workers through labor movements. American policy guidance for economic reform of Japan was vast in scope and revolutionary in its aims. Occupation forces enacted those policies through the Japanese government and through close involvement with implementation. Through these sweeping economic reforms, American forces in large part built Japan into the world's second largest economy, a key American trading partner, and even a peer-rival to U.S. economic power in the world. The lasting global impact of U.S. Army economic stabilization operations in Japan after World War II continues to be felt.

¹⁸⁴ Hadley, "Deconcentration to Reverse Course," 138.

Conclusions

Army forces conduct wide area security to...control hostile populations and compel them to act in a manner consistent with U.S. objectives. Effective wide area security is essential for consolidating tactical and operational gains that, over time, set conditions for achieving strategic goals.

– The Army Operating Concept, 2016-2026

The Army Operating Concept states that the U.S. Army must successfully perform wide area security in order to defeat the wide range of threats confronting the United States in the modern operating environment.¹⁸⁵ While ground forces use combined arms maneuver to defeat opposing armed forces, only wide area security converts tactical victories into “a better peace.”¹⁸⁶ Like the raising of stability operations to co-equal status with offensive and defense operations in the 2008 FM 3-0 *Operations*, the current official emphasis of wide area security reflects recognition by national policy makers that the U.S. Army will occupy territory after major combat operations conclude.¹⁸⁷ Despite a cultural reluctance built up during the Cold War and reinforced by perceived failures in Vietnam and elsewhere, Army professionals understand that successful occupation duties, now more-palatably termed stability operations, are necessary to convert enemies to lasting partners. The U.S. Army continues to build doctrine, training, organizations, and education systems to fill the requirements of prolonged occupations among populations that do not necessarily see American Soldiers as liberators.

¹⁸⁵ TRADOC, *Army Operating Concept*, 11.

¹⁸⁶ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Farber and Farber, 1985), 353.

¹⁸⁷ U.S. Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2008), 3-1.

The Army and the United States have realized the necessity of stability operations before. Confronted with the challenge of eminent war against the Axis Powers in 1940, American policy makers recognized that lasting victory would require occupying Japan with American Soldiers long enough to transform those nations into lasting partners.¹⁸⁸ The Army created the ways and means to fulfill the tasks required of such a strategy. Planning for occupation began early, and MacArthur's planners designed operational approaches to guide the employment of forces to secure formerly hostile homelands. Once on the ground and engaged in stability operations, American forces with civilian interagency partners effectively executed myriad stability tasks over the period of several years. In masterfully conducting what is now called wide area security, American and allied service members truly ended World War II. The occupiers of Japan transformed implacable foes into lasting partners through a good combination of strategy, operational planning, and tactical execution.

Japan during the post-World War II period was a unique environment never to be exactly duplicated. Nevertheless, the preparation and execution of Operation BLACKLIST from 1945 until 1952 should be studied to identify lessons applicable in current and future stability operations. First among these must be the acceptance of wide area security as an essential Army task by civilian and military leaders. Now as in 1940, no other arm of the U.S. Government has the capabilities, resources, and sheer manpower required to occupy a recently hostile territory for the extended period of time needed to transform the environment. Regardless of the desirability of the task, lasting peace requires transformation of the foe which can only occur through successful military

¹⁸⁸ Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs*, 6-7.

conduct of wide area security. Army forces and institutions must be doctrinally prepared, institutionally trained, and deliberately organized for prolonged stability operations. The occupation of Japan succeeded because the American Army was prepared to execute a strategy that included prolonged wide area security.

Second, the planners of GEN MacArthur's headquarters and subordinate units like Eighth Army demonstrated effective operational planning for stability operations. MacArthur's team developed a detailed post-conflict plan in parallel to their plans for a massive invasion of the Japanese home islands. American forces in the Pacific were therefore prepared for catastrophic success when the Japanese unexpectedly surrendered on August 15, 1945. Their design concept recognized the need to rapidly build overwhelming presence throughout the defeated nation to enforce the terms of the war termination documents. The tempo of occupation prevented a prolonged period of uncertainty that could have provided an opportunity for the breakdown of civil order and ignition of an insurgency. The phasing of the occupation emphasized initial actions that established security through rapid demilitarization of the Japanese home islands and that prevented humanitarian disaster. The later phases of the plan placed emphasis on transformation of the political, economic, and social institutions to provide conditions for self-sustained stability. The planned command structure provided an unbroken line of control from the occupation policy makers through the operational headquarters to the military governance teams in the field. This ensured a uniform approach toward the population throughout the nation while retaining flexibility at the local level to account for unique issues. Finally, the planners showed awareness of the alien culture of Japan and their own organizations' inability to effectively govern without the assistance of

Japanese institutions. Operation BLACKLIST directed indirect military governance by placing effective U.S. oversight structures in contact with the retained Japanese state bureaucracy. This reduced the scale of U.S. Army-Japanese official interactions to manageable levels. Operation BLACKLIST should not be viewed as blueprint to duplicate for successful stability planning. However, the elements of its design should be emulated by operational planners in modern stability environments.

Finally, Eighth Army and its subordinate units provide historical examples of the execution of all of the stability tasks described in current Army doctrine. Initial actions by American units within the civil security sector such as the quick and thorough disarmament of the Japanese armed forces limited potential for a restart of conflict. Similarly, first steps toward civil control including the coopting of the Japanese police force and judicial system prevented the breakdown of societal order. Americans immediately began to provide essential services like emergency food supplies and medical care that staved off humanitarian disaster in the exhausted nation of over 70 million that had been devastated by Allied strategic bombing. American officials begin to draw down American forces only after setting initial conditions of stability and cooperation with the local populous. With a safe and secure environment established, American occupation forces turned their efforts to transformative actions across all five stability sectors. Every facet of Japanese life was affected by SCAP reforms, from the status of women in society to the continued role of the Emperor as national though mortal symbol. As widespread and deep as the reforms were, American forces secured the changes by working with and through the Japanese government with sensitivity to the vast cultural differences between America and Japan. Idealist concepts of progressivism

were rapidly amended for practical implementation when societal fractures appeared. American operational forces understood that to build a self-sustaining free market democracy, they were required to sometimes protect that fragile work with authoritarian policies and strict implementation. The 1947 Constitution of Japan, written by the American occupiers and still governing the Japanese state, remains a monument to the success of Eighth Army and its component units. Through seven years of occupation, Eighth Army set a standard for operational execution of post conflict stability operations that provides lessons to modern practitioners.

Eighth Army executed successful stability operations that transformed a ceasefire between bitter enemies into an alliance between peer nations that is now almost 60 years old. Operational success grew directly from policy and strategy that embraced stability operations as essential for lasting peace. Detailed design of the post-conflict plan occurred at MacArthur's headquarters in parallel with plans for continued war-fighting and was not left to be considered after the shooting stopped. Professionals trained for stability operations led execution of the plans by, with and through the institutions of the occupied nation. Massive Allied forces quickly established a safe and secure environment that enabled long-standing transformation toward a lasting peace. While the grammar of the occupation of Japan, its historical and cultural circumstances, are as unique as any current or future stability operation, the logic shown by the American operations in Japan can be applied now and into the future. As the U.S. Army builds doctrine, theory and practice for wide area security into the future, its professionals can look to the history of the American occupation of Japan for lessons and guidance.

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